The fraud rarely looks like fraud. An attacker gets into the supplier's mailbox, waits for a real invoice in an active thread, and replies from the real address with new ACH or wire details and a reason to hurry. Because the email can be genuine, the only reliable check is outside email.
Paste the email with its headers: it flags Reply-To tricks, look-alike and new domains, failed SPF/DKIM/DMARC and the usual wording, checks the routing number's format, and gives you a record to file.
Phase 2 took effect on 19 June 2026 (practically 22 June): every non-consumer ACH originator, third-party service provider and third-party sender must have risk-based processes and procedures reasonably intended to identify entries suspected of being unauthorized or authorized under false pretenses, and review them at least annually. Phase 1 (20 March 2026) covered ODFIs and originators with 6 million or more ACH entries in 2023. The rules don't require screening every entry, and don't change who is liable. A documented bank-change verification step is the obvious place to start.
Paste the email with its headers: it flags Reply-To tricks, look-alike and new domains, failed SPF/DKIM/DMARC and the usual wording, checks the routing number's format, and gives you a record to file.
What happened the last time a supplier's bank details changed, and how did your team confirm it?
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